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INTRODUCTION 
On May 22, 2013, Lois Lerner, director of the IRS tax-exempt 
organizations division, appeared before the House of Representatives 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Oversight 
Committee).1  Lerner was called to testify about the IRS’s alleged 
targeting of conservative groups seeking 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status.2  
Oversight Committee Chairman Representative Darrell Issa3 issued a 
subpoena compelling Lerner to come before the Committee, despite 
being informed through her counsel that she would assert her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.4  In a letter dated May 
20, 2013 to Chairman Issa, Lerner’s attorney explained that she would 
invoke her Fifth Amendment right because the Department of Justice 
was simultaneously conducting a criminal investigation on the alleged 
targeting of conservative groups by the IRS.5  The letter requested 
that Lerner be excused from the hearing and asserted that she “has 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs: Hearing before H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 22 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 
Oversight Committee Hearing] (statement of Lois Lerner, Director of Exempt 
Organizations, Internal Revenue Service), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/2013-05-22-Ser.-No.-113-33-FC-The-IRS-Targeting-
Americans-for-Their-Pol-Beliefs.pdf.  The allegation that the IRS engaged in 
heightened scrutiny of conservative organizations seeking tax-exempt status caused a 
national uproar. See, e.g., Chelsea J. Carter et al., ‘Angry’ Obama Announces IRS 
Leader’s Ouster After Conservatives Targeted, CNN (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/politics/irs-conservative-targeting/. 
 2. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Lois 
Lerner, Director of Exempt Organizations, Internal Revenue Service). 
 3. Republican member of Congress representing California’s 49th congressional 
district and Chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
 4. Letter from William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, to Hon. Darrell 
E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform (May 20, 2013). 
 5. Id. 
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not committed any crimes or made any misrepresentation but under 
the circumstances she has no choice but to take this course.”6 
Notwithstanding the request to be excused from the hearing, 
Chairman Issa compelled Lerner to appear before the Oversight 
Committee “because of, among other reasons, the possibility that she 
will waive or choose not to assert the privilege.”7  On the day of the 
televised hearing, before invoking her Fifth Amendment right, Lerner 
read aloud a brief opening statement that proclaimed in general terms 
her innocence of any wrongdoing.8  In response, Chairman Issa and 
Oversight Committee Republicans argued that by offering an opening 
statement Lerner had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege and 
should be subject to questioning by the Oversight Committee.9  An 
exchange between Congressman Trey Gowdy10 and Oversight 
Committee Ranking Member Elijah Cummings11 summarized the 
dispute: 
Mr. Gowdy: Mr. Issa, Mr. Cummings just said we should run this 
like a courtroom, and I agree with him.  She just testified.  She just 
waived her Fifth Amendment right to privilege.  You don’t get to 
tell your side of the story and then not be subjected to cross 
examination.  That’s not the way it works.  She waived her right of 
Fifth Amendment privilege by issuing an opening statement.  She 
ought to stay in here and answer our questions . . . . 
Mr. Cummings: Mr. Chairman, . . . first of all, with all respect for my 
good friend Mr. Gowdy, I said I would like to see it run like a 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Letter from Hon. Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, to William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP (May 21, 2013). 
 8. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Lois 
Lerner, Director of Exempt Organizations, Internal Revenue Service) (“I have not 
done anything wrong.  I have not broken any laws.  I have not violated any IRS rules 
or regulations, and I have not provided false information to this or any other 
congressional committee.  And while I would very much like to answer the 
committee’s questions today, I’ve been advised by my counsel to assert my 
constitutional right not to testify or answer questions related to the subject matter of 
this hearing.  After very careful consideration, I have decided to follow my counsel’s 
advice and not testify or answer any of the questions today.  Because I’m asserting 
my right not to testify, I know that some people will assume that I’ve done something 
wrong.  I have not.”). 
 9. Id. at 23–24. 
 10. Republican member of Congress representing South Carolina’s fourth 
congressional district. 
 11. Democratic member of Congress representing Maryland’s seventh 
congressional district and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform. 
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federal court.  Unfortunately, this is not a federal court, and she 
does have a right, and I think . . . we have to adhere to that.12 
Still, Lerner refused to answer any questions, and eventually 
Chairman Issa recessed the hearing and allowed Lerner to leave.13 
On June 28, 2013, just over a month after the initial hearing, the 
Oversight Committee voted that “Lerner’s self-selected, and entirely 
voluntary, opening statement constituted a waiver of her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because a witness 
may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the 
details.”14  Additionally, in response to Lerner’s testimony, 
Congressman Mo Brooks15 introduced legislation on June 20, 2013 to 
“terminate any Federal employee who refuses to answer questions or 
gives false testimony in a congressional hearing.”16 
Despite voting that Lerner had waived her right to remain silent 
and passing a resolution and introducing legislation that would 
automatically terminate any federal employee who declined to 
answer questions at a congressional hearing, the Oversight 
Committee was not yet done with Lerner.  On March 5, 2014, 
Chairman Issa compelled Lerner to reappear before the Oversight 
Committee17 despite again being informed by counsel that Lerner 
would not answer questions pursuant to her Fifth Amendment right.18  
At the hearing, Lerner once more declined to answer questions from 
the Committee.19  This time, in response to Lerner’s decision to 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 23. 
 13. Id. at 24.  The damage to Lerner was already done.  She subsequently retired 
on September 13, 2013. See John D. McKinnon, Lois Lerner, at Center of IRS 
Investigation, Retires, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304713704579093461064758006. 
 14. Resolution of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th 
Cong. (2013), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
Resolution-of-the-Committee-on-Oversight-and-Government-Reform-6-28-131.pdf. 
 15. Republican member of Congress representing Alabama’s fifth congressional 
district. 
 16. H.R. 2458, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 17. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs before H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Oversight 
Committee Hearing]. 
 18. Letter from William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, to Hon. Darrell 
E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Feb. 26, 2014) (on file 
with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform). 
 19. 2014 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 17. 
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invoke her constitutional right, the Oversight Committee voted to 
hold her in criminal contempt of Congress.20 
Roughly one month later, the House of Representatives held 
Lerner in contempt by a vote of 231 to 187.21  The Resolution holding 
Lerner in contempt, House Resolution 574, directed the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives to certify the Oversight Committee’s 
report regarding Lerner’s refusal to testify before the Committee to 
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.22  It also directed the 
U.S. Attorney to “take all appropriate action to enforce the 
subpoena.”23  If Lerner is found guilty under the current criminal 
contempt statute, she faces a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment 
for up to one year.24 
Tension between the individual right against self-incrimination and 
Congress’s investigative role is not new.  When political scandals 
arise, legislators are quick to conduct public and high-profile 
investigations and to subpoena the actors involved to testify and 
explain their actions.25  For example, the Fifth Amendment played a 
prominent role during the McCarthy era when Congress investigated 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Josh Hicks, House Committee Votes to Hold Ex-IRS Official Lois Lerner in 
Contempt, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
federal-eye/wp/2014/04/10/house-committee-votes-to-hold-ex-irs-official-lois-lerner-
in-contempt-of-congress/. 
 21. H.R. Res. 574, 113th Cong. (2014).  The vote split along partisan lines with 
only six Democrats voting in favor of the resolution and no Republicans voting 
against it. See Ed O’Keefe, House Votes to Hold Lois Lerner in Contempt of 
Congress, WASH. POST, May 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2014/05/07/house-votes-to-hold-lois-lerner-in-contempt-of-congress/. 
 22. H.R. Res. 574. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2012) (“Every person who having been summoned as a witness 
by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers 
upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee 
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any 
committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having 
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than 
$1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one 
month nor more than twelve months.”). 
 25. This phenomenon is not limited to Congress.  For example, the tension 
presented itself following revelations that New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s staff 
members and political appointees had intentionally closed multiple lanes at a toll 
plaza entrance on the George Washington Bridge as political retribution against Fort 
Lee Mayor Mark Sokolic.  In the midst of numerous state and federal hearings and 
investigations, several people involved have asserted their Fifth Amendment rights. 
See, e.g., David W. Chen & William K. Rashbaum, Former Aide to Christie Invokes 
Fifth Amendment Right, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/
04/nyregion/former-aide-to-christie-invokes-fifth-amendment.html. 
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alleged communist infiltration in American society26 and during the 
Iran-Contra affair investigation that shook the Reagan presidency.27  
In both instances, Congress engaged in high-profile, public 
investigations and was confronted with witnesses who asserted their 
Fifth Amendment rights and declined to answer questions.  Yet, 
despite the persistent conflict between individual rights and 
Congress’s investigative powers, there is no definitive standard to 
guide or control situations where members of Congress wish to 
compel a witness to appear before a congressional committee when 
counsel informs them that the witness will invoke his or her Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. 
Given the recurring ethical and constitutional issues involved, the 
District of Columbia Bar (D.C. Bar) has offered one approach to 
address this divisive subject in the form of an advisory ethics 
opinion.28  D.C. Legal Ethics Opinion 358 (Opinion 358) provides that 
“a violation [of the rules of ethics] occurs only where the summons [of 
a witness who intends to assert his or her Fifth Amendment right] 
serves no substantial purpose ‘other than to embarrass, delay, or 
burden’ the witness.”29  In other words, according to the D.C. Bar’s 
advisory analysis, a lawyer may call a witness to appear even if he or 
she knows the witness will refuse to answer questions, so long as the 
lawyer’s intent is not solely to pillory the witness.30 
In light of the ever-growing partisanship in Washington31 and the 
increasing politicization of congressional investigations,32 the tension 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). 
 27. See, e.g., Iran-Contra Hearings: Sharp Words on Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/14/world/iran-contra-hearings-sharp-
words-on-immunity.html. 
 28. See generally Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward 
More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 314 
(2002) (explaining that “in many jurisdictions the ethics opinion will be purely 
advisory”). 
 29. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Op. 358 (2011) (quoting D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Op. 31 
(1977)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among 
Public, Is Greater Than Ever, PEW RES. CENTER, July 17, 2013, http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-
among-public-is-greater-than-ever/.  This increased polarization is also apparent from 
other congressional investigations into hot button issues such as the attack on the 
American embassy in Benghazi and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
operation “Fast and Furious” fiasco. See Keith Boykin, Grandstanding and Hype, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/08/are-
congressional-hearings-serious-investigations-or-just-party-politics/grandstanding-
and-hype; Ernesto Londoño & Karen DeYoung, At Benghazi Hearing, State Dept. 
2014] TO CALL OR NOT TO CALL 575 
between individual Fifth Amendment rights and Congress’s 
investigative mandate is likely to recur with prominence and 
increased acrimony in the future.  Without a clear standard to 
determine when to compel individuals to appear in person and assert 
their constitutional rights, lawmakers will be left making ad hoc 
decisions.  This result raises significant ethical, constitutional, and 
legislative policy concerns. 
This Note provides a detailed analysis of whether members of 
Congress should be able to compel a witness to appear before a 
committee when the individual has stated that he or she will invoke 
the right against self-incrimination.33  Part I of this Note discusses the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Congress’s 
broad investigative authority, and the tension that arises between the 
two.  Part II analyzes three possible approaches to address situations 
when individuals inform congressional committees beforehand that 
they will invoke their right against self-incrimination: (1) excuse the 
witness from appearing before the committee, (2) compel the witness 
to appear before the committee and invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege live and in-person, and (3) compel the witness to appear 
before the committee unless the sole purpose of calling the witness is 
to shame or pillory him or her.  Finally, Part III explains why 
members of Congress should excuse a witness who has formally 
expressed through counsel that he or she will assert a valid privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Such an approach would establish a 
proper, ethical balance between Congress’s investigative power and 
the individual constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
                                                                                                                 
Officials Challenge Administration Review of Attacks, WASH. POST, May 8, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/house-committee-holds-
hearing-on-benghazi-attacks/2013/05/08/639da672-b7ea-11e2-b94c-b684dda07add_
story.html. 
 32. See Boykin, supra note 31. 
 33. According to the Congressional Research Service, 156 members of the House 
of Representatives and fifty-five Senators in the 113th Congress are attorneys. 
JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42964, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 113TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 3 (2014), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-
publish.cfm?pid=%260BL%2BR%5CC%3F%0A.  Nearly forty percent of Congress 
is comprised of lawyers. See id.  Further, the rules, regulations, and guidelines that 
regulate attorneys should inform the behavior of all members, as Congress is the law-
making branch of the government. 
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I.  THE TENSION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONGRESS’S 
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY 
Congress has conducted investigations since America’s inception, 
even though the Constitution contains no explicit language granting 
Congress such power.  The first congressional investigation began in 
1792, just three years after the Constitution’s ratification, when the 
House of Representatives established a committee to investigate 
General Arthur St. Clair’s defeat by American Indians at the Battle 
of the Wabash.34  A seven-member special committee was formed to 
investigate the cause of the army’s defeat by the combined forces of 
the Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware Indian Tribes.35  During the 
debate on the Floor of the House of Representatives, it is clear that 
no member of Congress questioned the House’s inherent authority to 
investigate.36  Precedent to conduct such an inquiry was also readily 
available in both the British Parliament and the American colonies’ 
legislatures.37  For over a century, Congress continued to investigate 
issues as it saw fit, with minimal involvement or supervision by the 
judiciary.38 
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court formally recognized Congress’s 
power to engage in oversight and conduct investigations necessary to 
carry out its legislative functions.39  Subsequent cases reaffirmed the 
expansive breadth of Congress’s investigative power.40  The Court in 
Watkins v. United States observed, more specifically, that Congress’s 
investigative power “comprehends probes into departments of the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting 
the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2458–60 
(2002).  By a vote of forty-four to ten, Congress adopted a resolution which 
appointed a committee to investigate the army’s defeat and empowered it “to call for 
such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” Id. at 
2459. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See M. Nelson McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical 
Development, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 425 (1951). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929) (noting “the power of 
inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function”); McGrain 
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (recognizing Congress’s authority to conduct 
investigations to effectively legislate). 
 40. Eastland v. United States Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1975); 
Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (“In short, 
there can be no question that Congress has a right—derived from its Article I 
legislative function—to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding right to the 
information that is the subject of such subpoenas.”). 
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Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste,”41 
and referred further to “the power of the Congress to inquire into and 
to publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies 
of government.”42  The Court has consistently recognized that 
Congress has broad authority to investigate when it is acting to 
further legitimate legislative ends or is overseeing the federal 
government. 
While Congress has expansive oversight authority, its power is not 
unlimited.43  It must be exercised pursuant to and in aid of Congress’s 
legislative function, and not “to expose the private affairs of 
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of 
Congress . . . [and] must be related to, and in furtherance of, a 
legitimate task of the Congress.”44  Courts have held that a committee 
lacks legislative purpose if it appears to be performing a legislative 
trial instead of conducting an investigation to further its legislative 
purpose.45  For example, in United States v. Icardi, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia dismissed the perjury charge against a 
defendant because the congressional subcommittee that questioned 
the defendant was not acting as a “competent tribunal”46 at the time.  
The court explained that to act as a competent tribunal, a committee 
must be “pursuing a bona fide legislative purpose when it secures the 
testimony of any witness.”47  Because the court in Icardi determined 
that the subcommittee was not acting pursuant to a legitimate 
legislative purpose, but was instead conducting a “legislative trial,” it 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges.48  Although 
cases such as Icardi highlight the limit to Congress’s ability to 
investigate, when Congress is acting as a competent tribunal, it enjoys 
broad authority to obtain information it deems relevant to its 
inquiry.49 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
 42. Id. at 200 n.33. 
 43. Id. at 187. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1956); see also 
United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D.D.C. 1959) (“[W]hen a duly 
constituted investigative committee questions a witness solely for a purpose other 
than to elicit facts in aid of legislation, that committee steps outside its authority and 
no longer acts as a competent tribunal.”). 
 46. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 388. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 388–89. 
 49. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (upholding 
Congress’s power to issue subpoenas). 
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A key component of Congress’s investigative power is its authority 
to subpoena witnesses.50  The Supreme Court explained that 
Congress’s subpoena power is necessary because, “mere requests for 
such information often are unavailing, and . . . information which is 
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of 
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.”51  Similar to its 
general investigative power, Congress may issue subpoenas so long as 
they further a valid legislative purpose and are not mere “fishing 
expeditions.”52  The Court in Watkins noted that subpoenaed 
information that is “unrelated to any legislative purpose” must yield 
to the individual right to privacy.53  While the subpoena power is a 
critical tool for Congress’s investigative efforts, it is not the only way 
Congress can obtain information from recalcitrant sources.54 
Congress also has the power to hold individuals who obstruct the 
legislative process in contempt.55  The contempt power may be 
wielded in three distinct ways.56  First, Congress has the ability to 
employ its constitutional authority to detain and imprison an 
individual until he or she complies with congressional demands.57  
Second, pursuant to the criminal contempt statute,58 Congress can 
certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal 
prosecution of the contemnor.59  Since 1935, Congress has primarily 
utilized criminal contempt when dealing with noncompliant 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) (noting that “[i]t is contrary to the first 
principles of justice to allow a search through all the respondents’ records, relevant or 
irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up”). 
 53. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198. 
 54. Congress can find individuals in contempt for obstructing the legislative 
process. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012). 
 55. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194; see generally TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND 
PROCEDURE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (2014), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf. 
 56. GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1. 
 57. Id.  In 1795, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution holding 
Robert Randall, an American businessman, in contempt for attempting to bribe 
members of Congress. See O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2462.  Upon adoption of the 
resolution, Randall was arrested and placed in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms 
until he petitioned the House for forgiveness. See id.  The Court explicitly affirmed 
Congress’s inherent contempt power in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 233 (1821). 
 58. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194. 
 59. GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1. 
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witnesses.60  Lastly, Congress can seek civil judgment from a federal 
court declaring that the contemnor must comply with the subpoena.61 
Congress passed its first statute enabling criminal contempt by the 
legislative body in 1857, and the statute still exists in the modern 
day.62  The current criminal contempt statute provides that a witness 
is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be imprisoned for up to one year 
and fined up to $100,000 if he or she fails to testify or produce 
documents as ordered pursuant to a subpoena.63  The Supreme Court 
found that Congress’s contempt power is a natural outgrowth of its 
investigative power because without such an enforcement mechanism 
Congress would be “exposed to every indignity and interruption that 
rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it.”64 
In the 1950s, Congress’s investigative power came into direct 
conflict for the first time with the rights of individuals to assert their 
privilege against self-incrimination when subpoenaed to appear 
before, or provide documents to, a congressional committee.65  
During this period, anticommunist paranoia prompted Congress to 
hold numerous congressional hearings on the alleged communist 
infiltration of American society and government.66  These hearings 
were primarily convened by the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities and the Senator Joseph McCarthy-run Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations.67  To avoid becoming embroiled in 
                                                                                                                 
 60. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES 
CALLING: A PRIMER ON THE PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF 
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 16 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/175.pdf. (noting “this burden may be extremely difficult to 
meet”). 
 61. See GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1, 23–34.  The Senate has existing 
statutory authority to enforce subpoenas through civil contempt. See 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 288b(b), 288d (2012).  While the House of Representatives lacks explicit statutory 
authority to pursue civil contempt, the House appears able to authorize a committee 
to seek civil enforcement of a subpoena in federal court. See Comm. on the Judiciary 
v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2008).  In Miers, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia found that the House Committee on the Judiciary could 
properly seek enforcement of its subpoenas in federal court because the House had 
authorized the Judiciary Committee to seek civil enforcement action to compel 
compliance with its subpoenas in that instance. Id. at 70–71. 
 62. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, §3, 11 Stat. 156 (1857).  The constitutionality of 
the statute was upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 171 (1897). 
 63. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2012). 
 64. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821). 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself”). 
 66. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A 
Cautionary Tale, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2005). 
 67. Id. 
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these investigations and having their reputations ruined by being 
publicly accused of supporting communism, many witnesses began to 
invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination.68  Notably, 
the critical question that arose as individuals began to assert their 
constitutional rights in these congressional hearings was not whether 
the privilege applied in the congressional context, but whether the 
individuals had properly invoked their rights.69 
On its face, the Fifth Amendment speaks to “criminal trials.”  
Nonetheless, the privilege has traditionally been understood as 
applying to Congress.70  In the 1950’s, the Supreme Court reinforced 
this understanding in Quinn v. United States71 and Emspak v. United 
States.72  In Quinn and Emspak the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether an individual testifying before a congressional 
committee had actually asserted his or her privilege against self-
incrimination.73  Implicit in the Court’s analysis in these cases was the 
understanding that the right against self-incrimination can apply in 
the congressional context so long as the individual properly asserts 
the privilege.74 
In Quinn, the defendant, Quinn, was convicted of contempt for 
refusing to answer when asked whether he was a member of the 
communist party, citing vaguely to his rights under the First and Fifth 
Amendment.75  Quinn was sentenced to a term of six months in jail 
and a $500 fine.76  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed Quinn’s conviction, and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the appellate court’s holding.77  Although Quinn’s objections were 
imprecise and not specific to his Fifth Amendment right against self-
                                                                                                                 
 68. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Advances and Departures in the Criminal Law of the 
States: A Selective Critique, 69 ALB. L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 69. See O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2514–15. 
 70. James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1138 n.123 (2007) (explaining that “[d]uring the nineteenth 
century, the privilege was invoked on several occasions in response to congressional 
inquiries, including by Presidents Jackson and Grant”). 
 71. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955). 
 72. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955). 
 73. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162; Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194. 
 74. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162 (“In the instant case petitioner was convicted for 
refusing to answer the committee’s question as to his alleged membership in the 
Communist Party.  Clearly an answer to the question might have tended to 
incriminate him.  As a consequence, petitioner was entitled to claim the privilege.  
The principal issue here is whether or not he did.”); Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194. 
 75. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 157–58. 
 76. Id. at 159. 
 77. Id. at 160, 170. 
2014] TO CALL OR NOT TO CALL 581 
incrimination, the Court found that his words were adequate to have 
invoked the privilege.78  By holding that there is “no ritualistic 
formula . . . necessary in order to invoke the privilege,” the Court 
emphasized the breadth and importance of Fifth Amendment rights.79  
According to the Court, all that is required to claim such a cherished 
and fundamental protection is a statement uttered in a way that a 
committee may “reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt 
to invoke the privilege.”80 
In Emspak v. United States, the companion case to Quinn, the 
Supreme Court addressed the same issue of whether the defendant 
had adequately asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege before 
Congress.81  In Emspak, the defendant refused to answer certain 
questions and stated, “I think it is my duty to endeavor to protect the 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, primarily the first 
amendment, supplemented by the fifth.”82  As in Quinn, the Court in 
Emspak restated that an individual does not need to assert a specific 
phrase or combination of words to invoke the right against self-
incrimination.83  Thus, the Court in Emspak, as well as Quinn, clearly 
recognized that individuals can invoke their Fifth Amendment right 
before congressional investigations. 
Over time, after the Supreme Court recognized that the right 
against self-incrimination applies to congressional investigations and 
witnesses continued to invoke their rights, society and Congress came 
to view the Fifth Amendment disfavorably.84  From a societal 
perspective, the Fifth Amendment privilege was seen as the refuge of 
scoundrels and an escape hatch for the guilty.85  During the McCarthy 
era, “the term ‘Fifth Amendment Communist’ came into fashion, 
designating witnesses who, faced with answering potentially 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. at 164. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 163.  Contrast this liberal interpretation of what constitutes an effective 
invocation of a witness’s privilege against self-incrimination with a defendant’s 
attempt to invoke his right to silence in the context of a law enforcement 
interrogation pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  In Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), the Court held that to effectively invoke his right to 
silence, the defendant must do so unambiguously and unequivocally. Id. at 381. 
 81. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 194. 
 82. Id. at 202. 
 83. Id. at 194. 
 84. See Friedelbaum, supra note 68, at 508; O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515. 
 85. See Friedelbaum, supra note 68, at 508 (“The constitutional safeguard, long 
recognized among the bulwarks of human liberty, came to be regarded in the popular 
idiom as a spurious defense by those who sought to conceal spurious acts.”). 
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incriminating congressional questions, refused to answer.”86  Even 
then-President Dwight Eisenhower went so far as to remark, “I must 
say I probably share the common reaction if a man has to go to the 
Fifth Amendment, there must be something he doesn’t want to tell.”87  
From a congressional standpoint, the Fifth Amendment privilege 
became a significant impediment to obtaining witness testimony.  This 
obstacle led to the passage of the Immunity Act of 1954, which gave 
Congress the power to compel incriminating testimony in exchange 
for immunizing the witness from criminal prosecution.88 
Despite the new version of immunity, the conflict between the 
Fifth Amendment and Congress’s investigatory power was far from 
over.  The type of immunity authorized by the Immunity Act of 1954 
was similar to early statutes that conferred “transactional” immunity 
upon the witness.89  Transactional immunity insulated the witness 
from criminal prosecution based on “any fact or act touching which 
he shall be required to testify before either House of Congress” while 
under a grant of immunity.90  Because of its sweeping scope, 
transactional immunity came to be known as the “immunity bath,” 
and was anathema to federal prosecutors who were conducting 
criminal probes at the same time Congress was investigating.91  
Further, transactional immunity created an incentive for individuals 
to confess to unrelated crimes while they were granted immunity to 
avoid prosecution for their other offenses.92  For example, in 1862, 
Congressman James F. Wilson93 noted, “every day persons are 
offering to testify before the investigating committees of the House in 
order to bring themselves within the pardoning power of the Act of 
                                                                                                                 
 86. O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515. 
 87. Daniel H. Pollitt, The Fifth Amendment Plea Before Congressional 
Committees Investigating Subversion: Motives and Justifiable Presumptions—A 
Survey of 120 Witnesses, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1958). 
 88. The Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745; see Comment, The Federal 
Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional 
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1576–77 (1963).  The Immunity Act of 1954 was upheld 
by the Supreme Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956). 
 89. Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain 
Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (1992).  Congress 
passed the first federal immunity statute in 1857. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 
Stat. 155, 156.  This statute granted transactional immunity to any witnesses testifying 
before Congress. Id.  The statute provided extensive protections for any witness 
testifying before Congress under a grant of immunity. 
 90. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155, 156. 
 91. Murphy, supra note 89, at 1015. 
 92. Id. at 1015 n.34. 
 93. Republican member of Congress representing Iowa’s first congressional 
district from 1861 through 1869. 
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1857 [the transactional immunity statute].”94  These concerns with the 
transaction immunity’s broad reach eventually led Congress to revise 
its approach. 
In 1970 Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act, which 
established a more limited form of immunity known as “use” or 
“derivative use” immunity.95  Use immunity provides that the 
testimony a witness gives and the information derived from it cannot 
be used against the person in a subsequent criminal proceeding.96  
However, an individual may be convicted of the crime based on 
information obtained independently by the prosecution.97  This type 
of immunity was upheld by the Supreme Court two years after its 
passage in Kastigar v. United States.98  In Kastigar, the government 
obtained a court order “directing petitioners to answer questions and 
produce evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity 
conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003.”99  The witnesses in 
question appeared before the grand jury but refused to answer 
questions, asserting their privilege against self-incrimination.100 The 
witnesses were then brought before the District Court for the Central 
District of California and found in contempt.101  The case eventually 
made its way to the Supreme Court, and the Court affirmed the 
decision to hold the witnesses in contempt.102  The Supreme Court 
explained that the “immunity from use and derivative use [under 18 
U.S.C. § 6002] is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony 
over a claim of the privilege.”103  In other words, because the 
prosecution cannot use information revealed when an immunized 
witness testifies—unless the information was independently 
obtained—use immunity does not violate an individual’s right against 
compelled self-incrimination.104 
                                                                                                                 
 94. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 364 (1862). 
 95. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926 
(codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–05 (1988)). 
 96. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-464, INVESTIGATIVE 
OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 8 (1995). 
 97. Id. 
 98. 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (finding use and derivative use immunity as adequate 
protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
 99. Id. at 442. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 462. 
 103. Id. at 453. 
 104. Id. 
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This legislative approach has still not resolved the conundrum of 
whether members of Congress should compel an individual to appear 
before a committee to invoke the right against self-incrimination.  If a 
witness is prosecuted after giving immunized testimony, the 
prosecution has the burden of showing that the charges were not 
based on the witness’s testimony or evidence derived therefrom.105  
Establishing that the prosecution grew out of independent evidence 
has proven in practice to be a heavy burden for the prosecution to 
overcome.106 
The Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan presidency 
demonstrates the difficulty of prosecuting an individual after he or 
she has given use-immunized testimony.107  This inquiry involved a 
congressional investigation into whether the Reagan Administration 
sold weapons to Iran and used the proceeds to fund anti-communist 
rebels in Nicaragua.108  High-ranking officials, including Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North, were given use immunity, and testified before 
Congress in a publicly televised hearing.109  Simultaneously, the 
Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court appointed an independent counsel 
to investigate any criminal wrongdoing in the affair.110 
Subsequent to providing his testimony, Lieutenant North was 
convicted on conspiracy and obstruction charges.111  The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Lieutenant North’s 
conviction and remanded the case on the basis that the conviction was 
obtained in reliance on immunized testimony.112  The court of appeals 
reached this conclusion even though the prosecution had taken 
“extraordinary” steps to avoid relying on Lieutenant North’s 
statements, including submitting sealed evidence packets to the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (explaining that granting immunity “imposes on the 
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony”) 
 106. Id. at 461–62 (explaining that “[o]ne raising a claim under this [use immunity] 
statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to 
the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to 
use was derived from legitimate independent sources”); see also ROSENBERG, supra 
note 60, at 13 (noting “this burden may be extremely difficult to meet”). 
 107. See Murphy, supra, note 89, at 1035–37. 
 108. Id. at 1035. 
 109. Id. at 1036. 
 110. Id. at 1035. 
 111. Id. at 1037. 
 112. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), 
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam). 
2014] TO CALL OR NOT TO CALL 585 
district court.113  Upon remand, the prosecution dismissed the case 
because it could not meet its burden of showing that all of the 
evidence it proposed to use was derived from legitimate independent 
sources.114  The failed prosecution of Lieutenant North epitomizes the 
heavy burden the prosecution must overcome to successfully 
prosecute a high-profile case where the witness has been granted use 
immunity. 
In light of this extensive history, the question remains: what can a 
member of Congress do when he or she wishes to question a witness 
but the witness intends to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, and granting the witness immunity may serve as a de 
facto bar to any potential criminal prosecution?  The popular current 
approach for Congress, as in Lois Lerner’s case, is to compel witness 
testimony without offering any form of immunity.115  This tactic can 
readily devolve into public shaming because the witness is forced to 
assert her right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions in full 
view of television cameras and the press.116  Further, technological 
developments, such as congressional committee websites that live-
stream the hearings, ensure that the witness’s assertion of her 
constitutional rights is subject to endless electronic airings via 
websites such as YouTube.117  Therefore, to establish a more ethical 
and appropriate approach to situations where a witness refuses to 
answer questions based on a valid claim of Fifth Amendment 
privilege, Congress should look to other analogous circumstances for 
guidance. 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See ROSENBERG, supra, note 60, at 13. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Gregory Korte, Lois Lerner Wants Immunity in Exchange for IRS 
Testimony, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2014/02/26/lois-lerner-wants-immunity-in-exchange-for-irs-testimony/5834321/. 
 116. Id.  Lerner’s attorney noted that compelling her to appear before Congress 
when the committee knew she would invoke the Fifth Amendment “accomplishes 
nothing and needlessly embarrasses the witness.” Id. 
 117. For example, the House Oversight Committee provides video access to 
recordings of its hearings and business meetings, including both hearings where 
Lerner was present. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs, 
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (Mar. 5, 2014), http://oversight.
house.gov/hearing/irs-targeting-americans-political-beliefs/#. 
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II.  THREE APPROACHES TO BALANCING THE WITNESS’S 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WITH OTHER 
COMPELLING INTERESTS IN DIFFERENT LEGAL CONTEXTS 
Currently, there is no universal, binding standard to determine 
whether to compel an individual to appear before a congressional 
committee when the individual intends to invoke the right against 
self-incrimination.  To develop such a standard and balance 
Congress’s investigatory authority with the individual constitutional 
right against self-incrimination, it is prudent to examine how the Fifth 
Amendment has been addressed in other legal contexts.  
Congressional investigations are hardly the only arena where 
witnesses assert their privilege against self-incrimination.  In the 
criminal context, when a witness intends to invoke his or her Fifth 
Amendment right, prosecutors are counseled against compelling the 
witness to testify,118 and defendants are often barred from calling the 
witness.119  In the civil arena, an attorney is allowed to compel a 
witness to testify, regardless of whether the witness intends to invoke 
the right against self-incrimination.120  Finally, the D.C. Bar has issued 
an advisory Ethics Opinion finding it ethically permissible to compel 
a witness to appear so long as the sole purpose is not to pillory the 
individual.121 
A. Excusing the Witness from Appearing 
During congressional hearings, a witness’s Fifth Amendment right 
is pitted against Congress’s investigative mandate and legislative 
function.122  In criminal cases, on the other hand, the individual’s right 
to be free from self-incrimination can clash with the prosecution’s 
efforts to prove the charges against the defendant and with the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation and compulsory process 
rights.  However, in both the congressional and criminal contexts, one 
party may seek to compel a witness to testify despite the witness’s 
                                                                                                                 
 118. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
§ 3-5.7(c) (1993) (“A prosecutor should not call a witness in the presence of the jury 
who the prosecutor knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 689 (1931). 
 120. See generally Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (noting that an 
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intention to invoke the Fifth Amendment.  It is therefore instructive 
to consider how these conflicting interests are balanced in the 
framework of a criminal prosecution. 
1. Prosecution Calling a Witness Who Will Take the Fifth 
In a recurring scenario, the prosecution subpoenas a witness to 
testify and learns that the witness intends to invoke his or her 
privilege against self-incrimination.123  Nevertheless, the prosecution 
often would prefer to call the witness to testify and have him assert 
his Fifth Amendment right in the jury’s presence.  In that situation, 
the defendant is rendered unable to cross-examine the witness, 
because the witness’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination trumps the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right.124  Further, this leaves the jury to speculate to the 
detriment of the accused about what the witness was afraid to 
admit.125 
In Namet v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether 
it was improper for the prosecution to call a witness to invoke his 
Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury.126  The defendant in 
Namet challenged his conviction for violating federal wagering tax 
laws after the prosecution knowingly called two witnesses to testify 
who both intended to claim their privilege against self-
incrimination.127  The Court described two situations where calling 
such a witness could merit reversal: (1) where the prosecutor 
intentionally tries to prove his case from the inferences that arise 
when a witness asserts his privilege against self-incrimination,128 and 
(2) when the witness’s invocation aids the prosecution’s case.129  Based 
on the facts in Namet, the Court upheld the defendant’s conviction, 
because it found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct.130  The 
Court further explained that the invocations of privilege were not “of 
such significance in the trial that they constituted reversible error 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965); Namet v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 179, 186–87 (1963). 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding 
“the defendant’s right to discredit a prosecution witness on cross-examination cannot 
overcome the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination”). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 126. Namet, 373 U.S. at 186–87. 
 127. Id. at 180. 
 128. Id. at 186. 
 129. Id. at 187. 
 130. Id. at 189. 
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even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.”131  Despite 
upholding Namet’s conviction, the Court clearly expressed concern 
with a defendant facing unfair prejudice when a witness’s refusal to 
answer adds “critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not 
subject to cross-examination.”132 
The Court reaffirmed the Namet approach in Douglas v. 
Alabama.133  In Douglas, the defendant was convicted of assault with 
intent to murder.134  During the trial, while questioning a witness who 
was asserting his right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor read 
a document alleged to be a confession signed by the witness that 
implicated the defendant.135  The Court overturned the conviction, 
holding that an individual’s Sixth Amendment right is violated if the 
“inferences from a witness’s refusal to answer added critical weight to 
the prosecution’s case.”136  Thus, the Court reversed judgment in the 
defendant’s favor because the denial of the right to cross examine was 
not “a mere minor lapse” but played a fundamental role in the case 
against Douglas.137  In light of this holding, the prosecution in a 
criminal case must carefully balance the benefit of calling a witness 
who intends to invoke the right against self-incrimination with the 
risk of jeopardizing the prosecution.138 
While the Court has wrestled with the constitutional question of 
when, if ever, to allow the prosecution to call a witness it knows will 
assert his Fifth Amendment rights, the ethical standard that guides 
attorney action is clear.  American Bar Association Standard 3-5.7(c) 
(Standard 3-5.7(c)) provides that, “[a] prosecutor should not call a 
witness in the presence of the jury who the prosecutor knows will 
claim a valid privilege not to testify.”139  The plain language of 
Standard 3-5.7(c) unequivocally urges the prosecution not to bring a 
witness who will exercise his or her right not to testify before a jury.140  
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 187. 
 133. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965). 
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 139. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c) 
(1993). 
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The Standard also clearly states that when a prosecutor knows a 
witness will legitimately invoke the right not to testify, the prosecutor 
“should not call” the witness.141  Further, Standard 3-5.7(c) is entitled 
to substantial deference even though it is not a binding rule.142 
The interpretation of Standard 3-5.7(c) as a blanket prohibition on 
compelling witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights is 
bolstered through comparison with a previous version of the 
standard.  The 1971 version of Standard 3-5.7(c) read, “[a] prosecutor 
should not call a witness who the prosecutor knows will claim a valid 
privilege not to testify for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the 
fact of the claim of privilege.”143  The new version of Standard 3-5.7(c) 
no longer makes the “purpose” for calling the witness dispositive or 
even considers why the witness is called.144  Instead, prosecutors are 
now admonished not to call a witness in the presence of the jury if 
they are aware that the witness will invoke valid Fifth Amendment 
rights.145 
The Commentary to Standard 3-5.7(c) lends further support to this 
interpretation.  The Commentary states, “[i]f the prosecutor is 
informed in advance that the witness will claim a privilege and wishes 
to contest the claim, the matter should be treated without the 
presence of the jury and a ruling obtained.”146  Even in contesting the 
witness’s claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, the prosecutor should 
                                                                                                                 
expression of the meaning intended”).  While Standard 3-5.7(c) is not legislation, the 
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 141. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c) 
(1993). 
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cmt. at 105 (1993). 
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not raise this challenge in front of the jury.147  This reflects the strong 
preference for preventing an individual who seeks to assert his or her 
Fifth Amendment rights from being compelled to do so publicly and 
in front of a jury.148  Based on the plain language, history, and 
commentary to Standard 3-5.7(c), it is apparent that the ethical 
standard counsels the prosecution against calling a witness to assert 
his or her right against compelled self-incrimination. 
2. Defense Calling or Questioning a Witness Who Will Take or 
Already Has Asserted the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
The propriety and constitutionality of requiring a witness to invoke 
his rights in the jury’s presence must be viewed through a different 
lens when it is the defendant who seeks to call the witness.  In 
criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to 
confront the witnesses against him and to present evidence on his 
behalf.149  On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment affords witnesses 
the right to refuse to testify in order to avoid self-incrimination.150  
Thus, there are two competing individual constitutional rights 
implicated when considering whether a defendant may call a witness 
who will assert his or her Fifth Amendment right. 
The Court resolved this conflict by, in effect, exalting the Fifth 
Amendment in the landmark case Alford v. United States.  In Alford, 
the defendant, Alford, was convicted of mail fraud.151  At trial, Alford 
was denied the ability to question a witness regarding where he 
lived.152  The defense sought to question the witness about his address 
to establish that the witness was currently in federal custody and show 
that his incriminating testimony against Alford was biased.153  The 
district court denied the defense’s request to question the witness, and 
Alford was eventually convicted.154  Alford appealed his conviction, 
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and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “no obligation is 
imposed on the court . . . to protect a witness from being discredited 
on cross-examination.”155  However the Court limited its holding by 
explaining that where a defendant “attempt[s] invasion of [the 
witness’s] constitutional protection from self incrimination . . . [t]here 
is a duty to protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the 
bonds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or 
humiliate him.”156  In other words, the Court held that a witness’s 
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment can trump the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.157  
Alford illustrates the Court’s view of the depth, breadth, and 
importance of the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. 
Although a witness cannot be compelled to testify on the basis of 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the question remains 
whether the defendant can force the witness to invoke his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights in front of the jury.  In general, the same rule that 
binds the prosecution applies to the accused; the defendant may not 
call a witness simply to have the witness invoke his privilege against 
self-incrimination in front of the jury.158  For example, the First Circuit 
in United States v. Santiago,159 the Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Branch,160 and the D.C. Circuit in Bowles v. United States,161 have all 
concluded that the defense cannot call a witness to testify solely to 
compel them to assert their Fifth Amendment right in front of the 
jury. 
The First Circuit, in Santiago, held that the defendant could not 
force two witnesses who planned to invoke their right against self-
incrimination to testify.162  The defendant in Santiago challenged his 
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conviction for drug trafficking, arguing that he was denied his 
confrontation rights because he was not allowed to call two witnesses 
for questioning.163  While recognizing that the defendant had a right to 
present a complete defense, the First Circuit held that the defendant 
“was not . . . entitled to call the witnesses merely to have them assert 
their privilege before the jury.”164  The First Circuit explained its 
holding by noting that “[b]ecause a jury may not draw any legitimate 
inferences from a witness’ decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
privilege, . . . neither the prosecution nor the defense may call a 
witness to the stand simply to compel him to invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination.”165 
In Branch, the Fourth Circuit also affirmed the denial of the 
defendant’s request to call a witness whom the district court knew 
would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.166  In this case, the 
defendant, Branch, was convicted of possession and distribution of 
cocaine base and illegal possession of a firearm.167  During trial, 
Branch sought to call a witness, Johnson, arguing that it was 
“necessary because the jury could have concluded that Johnson, not 
Branch, owned the cocaine base and firearm found in the 
Mercedes.”168  The district court did not allow Branch to call Johnson 
to the stand, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
decision.  The Fourth Circuit explained that “placing Johnson on the 
stand solely to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege would lead to 
‘unfair prejudice’ in the form of both unwarranted speculation by the 
jury and the government’s inability to cross-examine Johnson.”169  
The Fourth Circuit also noted that “any inferences that the jury might 
have drawn from Johnson’s privilege assertion would have been only 
minimally probative—and likely improper—in any event.”170 
Similarly, in Bowles, the D.C. Circuit held that the defense could 
not call a witness to testify if the witness indicated that he would 
assert his right against self-incrimination.171  In Bowles, the defendant, 
Bowles, was convicted of first degree murder and assault with intent 
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to rob.172  The district court refused to allow the defense to call a 
witness to the stand after ascertaining that the witness would decline 
to answer questions pursuant to his right against self-incrimination.173  
Bowles appealed his conviction, arguing the district court wrongly 
prevented him from calling the witness.  In affirming the district 
court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit began by noting, “[i]t is well settled 
that the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision 
of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege whether those 
inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the defense.”174  
Following this conclusion, the court explained, “[a]n obvious 
corollary . . . is the rule that a witness should not be put on the stand 
for the purpose of having him exercise his privilege before the 
jury.”175  The court came to this conclusion based on the concern that 
allowing the defense to call a witness under such circumstances 
“would only invite the jury to make an improper inference.”176  
Accordingly, the Bowles court upheld the district court’s decision to 
prevent the defendant from calling the witness.177 
Thus, in the criminal prosecution context, courts and ethical 
standards side with the Fifth Amendment even when balancing it 
against the state’s interest in prosecuting individuals and the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and 
compulsory process.  As demonstrated by the Supreme Court as well 
as multiple Circuit Courts of Appeals, courts are disinclined to allow 
the prosecution or the defense to call witnesses who intend to invoke 
their privilege against self-incrimination.178  This result reflects the 
importance of the individual right against self-incrimination, even to 
the legal profession,179 and flows naturally from the recognition that 
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jurors might wrongly draw inferences from the witness’s failure to 
answer questions.180 
B. Compelling the Witness to Appear and Invoke the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege 
Although the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment refers to 
criminal proceedings,181 the Supreme Court has extended its 
protection to any proceeding, including civil cases.182  The right of the 
individual witness to avoid making incriminating statements may 
conflict with the general overarching public policy of ensuring the 
parties receive fairness and justice.183  To balance these competing 
interests, in civil proceedings and federal court, an individual may 
assert his or her constitutional right, but the factfinder can draw a 
negative inference based on this decision.184  In other words, while a 
witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil proceedings, a 
factfinder may make inferences based on the refusal to answer certain 
questions.185 
In McCarthy v. Arndstein, debtor Arndstein was adjudged an 
involuntary bankrupt and was subpoenaed to appear before a special 
commissioner to examine his assets.186  During questioning, 
Arndstein, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege, refused to answer 
certain questions which tended to incriminate him and was eventually 
held in contempt.187  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that 
Arndstein was entitled to decline to answer certain questions 
pursuant to his right against self-incrimination.188  Thus, the Court 
enabled witnesses to assert their Fifth Amendment rights in civil 
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proceedings.189  The Court’s reasoning in Arndstein is explicitly 
expanded in Kastigar v. United States, which held that privilege 
applies “in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or 
judicial, investigatory or adjudicative” where the witness reasonably 
believes that the information sought could be used against him or her 
in a subsequent proceeding.190 
While the Court in McCarthy extended the Fifth Amendment 
protection beyond criminal proceedings, invoking the right against 
self-incrimination does not come without costs.191  For instance, in 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, Palmigiano, an incarcerated individual in the 
Rhode Island Adult Correction Institution, challenged the prison’s 
disciplinary hearing process as unconstitutional.192  The prison’s policy 
allowed individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment right, but this 
silence could be used against them.193  The Supreme Court upheld the 
prison’s approach, explaining, “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid 
adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to 
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”194  
The Court emphasized that the negative inference was justified 
because the disciplinary hearing was not a criminal proceeding and 
therefore the stakes were lower.195 
After Baxter, in federal court, a party can comment on the 
witness’s assertion of his or her rights and ask the factfinder to draw a 
negative inference from this silence, such as that the witness engaged 
in improper or wrongful conduct.196  The Supreme Court’s holding in 
Baxter is particularly relevant to the question of whether a party can 
call a witness who intends to take the Fifth.197  Federal courts allow a 
party to call a witness to testify and assert his or her Fifth 
Amendment right.198  As a natural corollary to this rule, a party must 
first be able to compel the witness’s testimony in the presence of the 
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factfinder.199  If the witness is not compelled to testify, then there is no 
way for a factfinder to draw any inference from the witness.  It 
follows that in civil cases, a party may compel a witness to actually 
appear and assert his or her privilege against self-incrimination.200 The 
civil approach of allowing witnesses to be compelled to assert their 
Fifth Amendment privilege has proven influential in determining 
whether individuals should be compelled to appear before 
Congress.201 
C. Compelling the Witness to Appear Unless the Sole Purpose 
for Requiring the Witness to Appear is to Pillory or Humiliate 
In the congressional context, the D.C. Bar has offered advisory 
guidance on the narrower issue of the congressional staff lawyer’s 
ethical duty.202  Specifically, the D.C. Bar addressed whether a 
congressional staff lawyer violates his or her ethical duties by 
compelling a witness to appear before a committee when the witness 
intends to assert the right to remain silent.203  In two ethics opinions, 
the D.C. Bar has attempted to find equilibrium between the 
individual constitutional right against self-incrimination204 and 
Congress’s need to conduct oversight and investigations in 
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furtherance of its legislative role.205  While the opinions offer insight 
into this issue, they remain non-binding advisory opinions, like all 
ethics opinions.206  Further, the opinions only directly apply to staff 
attorneys acting in their capacities as lawyers because “[i]t is not 
within our province to pass upon the proprietary conduct by 
congressmen, who may or may not be lawyers, but are acting in any 
event as congressman.”207  Despite its limited scope and advisory 
nature, the D.C. Bar has offered helpful insight into the issue of 
whether witnesses should be compelled to appear before Congress to 
assert their Fifth Amendment rights. 
In 1977, the D.C. Bar first addressed this issue in D.C. Legal Ethics 
Opinion 31 (Opinion 31).208  In Opinion 31, the D.C. Bar advised on: 
[W]hether it is proper for a congressional committee whose 
chairman, staff and several members are attorneys to require a 
witness who is a ‘target’ of a pending grand jury investigation to 
appear at televised hearings to be questioned when the committee 
has been notified in advance that the witness will exercise his 
constitutional privilege not to answer any questions.”209   
The Opinion began by noting that regardless of the publicity and 
potential damage to a witness’s reputation, “[i]t is not per se improper 
for an attorney acting as counsel for a congressional committee to 
cause a witness to be summoned in furtherance of a legitimate 
legislative function of Congress.”210  Opinion 31 recognized that, when 
Congress is acting pursuant to a legitimate legislative function, it may 
be appropriate to require a witness to appear before a committee.211 
After determining that there may be instances where it is ethical to 
compel a witness to appear before a congressional committee, 
Opinion 31 acknowledged that when a person intends to invoke his or 
her Fifth Amendment right, “no information will be obtained and the 
sole effect of the summons will be to pillory the witness.”212  In such 
situations, Opinion 31 explained that the witness should not be 
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compelled to appear.213  Notably, Opinion 31 cites to ABA Standard 
3-5.7(c) as a source of support for its conclusion, which as discussed 
above, counsels prosecutors against compelling witnesses to appear 
before the jury to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege.214  The D.C. 
Bar summarized its view by stating, “it appears clear that the conduct 
described in the inquiry [compelling a witness to appear where no 
information will be obtained because the witness will invoke his or 
her constitutional right] is improper.”215 
In January 2011, the D.C. Bar was asked to vacate Opinion 31, and, 
in response, it promulgated Opinion 358.216  While the D.C. Bar 
“decline[d] [the] request to vacate Opinion 31,”217 it did clarify its 
opinion and, in the process, revised Opinion 31.  Opinion 358 began 
by restating that Opinion 31 “does not establish a per se rule that 
compelling a witness to testify before a congressional committee 
when it is known in advance that the witness will invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege violates the ethics rules.”218  This initial 
statement is a near verbatim recitation of the D.C. Bar’s 
determination in Opinion 31.219 
After this initial reaffirmation, Opinion 358 explained that “an 
attorney violates the ethics rules only when he knows that summoning 
a witness to appear (1) will provide no information to the committee 
and (2) is intended merely to degrade the witness.”220  Unless both 
conditions are met, an attorney can compel the witness to appear 
without violating an ethical duty.221  This reformulation holds that it is 
ethical for an attorney to call a witness even if the sole intent is to 
degrade him or her, so long as the witness will provide some 
information to the committee.222  Similarly, even if an attorney 
believes that the witness will not provide any information to the 
committee, the attorney can still compel the witness to appear 
publicly so long as the attorney’s sole intent is not to degrade the 
witness.223  This reformulation affords attorneys a great deal of 
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latitude in calling witnesses to appear publicly before congressional 
committees to invoke their constitutional rights.224  Opinion 358 
therefore makes it easier for attorneys to compel witnesses to invoke 
their Fifth Amendment rights before Congress while acting in 
accordance with the D.C. Bar’s advisory ethical guidelines.225 
Further, Opinion 358’s broad understanding of what constitutes a 
“legitimate purpose” for calling a witness will encourage attorneys to 
compel witnesses to publicly claim the right against self-
incrimination.226  Specifically, Opinion 358 asserts that requiring a 
witness to appear before a congressional committee to determine 
whether the individual will in fact invoke the right against self-
incrimination is a legitimate reason to bring a witness before 
Congress in a public setting.227  The D.C. Bar went on to explain that 
calling a witness to make such a determination is a legitimate reason 
for calling a witness, but it is not exclusive.228  This conclusion 
empowers an attorney to always be able to compel an individual to 
appear before Congress because there is no way to unequivocally 
determine whether a witness will invoke the right against self-
incrimination before he or she actually does so.229 
The permissive language in Opinion 358 is a stark departure from 
Opinion 31.230  Opinion 31 explained that “[t]here is certainly no need 
to have the test of claim of privilege take place in a televised open 
hearing with the resultant inevitable prejudicial publicity for the 
witness.”231  Opinion 31 continued, “[i]nsofar as the attorney has some 
question whether the witness will in fact claim his privilege if called, 
this question can be resolved by calling the witness in an executive 
session.”232  Whereas Opinion 31 explicitly urged against compelling 
an individual to publicly assert his or her Fifth Amendment right, 
Opinion 358 determined that testing the claim of privilege in a public 
hearing is a legitimate purpose for calling a witness.233  Therefore, the 
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approach outlined in Opinion 358 expands the situations where a 
lawyer can compel an individual to appear before Congress to 
publicly assert his or her constitutional rights while adhering to the 
D.C. Bar’s ethics opinion.234  While Opinion 358 is not compulsory, it 
remains a persuasive ethics opinion that broadly condones compelling 
witnesses to appear before Congress to assert the right against self-
incrimination.235  
III.  HOW TO BALANCE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION WITH CONGRESS’S LEGISLATIVE POWER: DO 
NOT COMPEL WITNESS TESTIMONY 
To ethically and effectively find equilibrium between these 
competing interests, members of Congress should follow the 
approach taken in criminal litigation and not compel witness 
testimony once counsel has informed Congress that the witness will 
assert his or her Fifth Amendment right.236  Implementing such an 
approach would not require legislative action or judicial holdings.  
Instead, both chambers of Congress would simply have to adopt their 
own rules prohibiting compelled attendance when a witness informs 
Congress that he or she will claim a valid right against self-
incrimination.237  This approach properly reflects the spirit of the 
ethics opinions, balances the individual Fifth Amendment privilege 
with Congress’s legislative interests, and ensures that Congress 
obtains accurate and reliable information to aid in the legislative 
process.  Conversely, compelling a witness to testify and allowing a 
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negative inference to be drawn from silence is inconsistent with 
ethical opinions, undermines the Fifth Amendment, and will result in 
legislation based on speculation.  Similarly, allowing witnesses to be 
called so long as the sole purpose of compelling the witness is not to 
pillory him or her is the functional equivalent of the civil approach 
and implicates the same ethical, constitutional, and policy concerns 
inherent in the civil context. 
A. Ethical Reasons Not to Compel Public Assertion of Fifth 
Amendment Right 
Members of Congress should follow the approach utilized in 
criminal litigation because congressional oversight, with its 
increasingly adversarial approach in high-profile investigations, has 
effectively become a means of public legislative trial.238  Further, 
congressional hearings often spur criminal investigations.239  As James 
Hamilton, partner with Bingham McCutchen LLP, Robert F. Muse, 
partner with Mitchell & Mezines, and Kevin R. Amer, attorney with 
the U.S. Department of Justice, explain in their article analyzing 
congressional investigations: 
Prosecutors read the newspapers and watch television.  A comment 
from the chairman that the witness may have violated criminal law is 
difficult to ignore and prosecutors have been known to initiate 
investigations based on concerns expressed by the committee.  And, 
ongoing criminal investigations have been reshaped by the 
testimony of congressional witnesses.240 
Because of the interrelated nature between criminal prosecutions 
and congressional hearings, the ethical rules that govern criminal 
prosecutions should also be applied to congressional hearings.  In 
fact, in issuing its initial ethical opinion regarding whether individuals 
should be compelled to appear publicly to assert the right to remain 
silent, the D.C. Bar relied on the legal and ethical standards that 
apply in criminal proceedings.241 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-16 (1980) (noting that the 
activities of a legislature may assume the characteristics of an adversary proceeding); 
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977) (analogizing congressional 
investigations to criminal proceedings). 
 239. See James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1171–72 (2007). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).  The Opinion cited to ABA 
Standard 3-5.7(c), Standard 3-3.6(e), and cases that held that summoning a witness in 
such circumstances constituted prosecutorial misconduct and potentially required 
602 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
If congressional oversight hearings are treated like criminal 
proceedings, Standard 3-5.7(c) should guide members of Congress 
when deciding whether to bring a witness before the committee.242  As 
discussed in Part II, Standard 3-5.7(c) counsels the prosecution 
against calling a witness in the presence of the jury when the 
prosecutor knows the witness will claim a valid privilege against 
testifying.243  In the congressional hearing context, Standard 3-5.7(c) 
would advise members of Congress—who act as the prosecutor as 
well as the judge and jury during hearings—against calling witnesses 
to appear before a committee.244  In congressional hearings, members 
of Congress act as the prosecution by determining what issues to 
investigate and bring before the committee.  They also act as the 
judge because they control the hearing’s procedure.  Additionally, 
they act as the jury because they make the ultimate findings of fact 
through reports and legislation. 
Applying Standard 3-5.7(c) to Congress would mean that once a 
witness informs the committee that he or she will invoke a valid claim 
of Fifth Amendment privilege, the witness will not be compelled to 
appear before the committee in a public hearing.  For example, as 
soon as the House Oversight Committee was informed that Lerner 
intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, it should not have 
compelled her presence at a public hearing.  This is not to say that the 
Committee would be prohibited from using alternative methods—
such as urging her to appear before the committee or requesting 
written testimony—to try to obtain the relevant information or 
convince her to testify.  It simply precludes requiring her to appear at 
a public congressional hearing.  Following Standard 3-5.7(c)’s 
guidance in the congressional context would thereby create a clear 
and easily applicable standard for determining whether to require a 
witness to testify.245 
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Further, Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 4.4 (Rule 4.4) 
lends additional support to applying Standard 3-5.7(c) to Congress.246  
Rule 4.4 counsels against compelling witness testimony when the 
witness intends to assert his or her right against self-incrimination.247  
Rule 4.4 advises further that “a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a 
third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the 
legal rights of such a person.”248  D.C. Bar’s discussion in Opinion 31 
supports the conclusion that requiring a witness to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege before a panel of members of Congress as well 
as reporters, video cameras, and the public has no other substantial 
purpose beyond pillorying the individual.249  Opinion 31 noted that 
once an individual expresses an intent to invoke a valid Fifth 
Amendment claim, the committee will obtain no information from 
the witness.250  The Opinion continues to explain that, in this situation, 
there is no need to test the claim of privilege in an open hearing 
because of “the resultant inevitable prejudicial publicity for the 
witness.”251  Therefore, because calling a witness to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment will yield no information and will harm the witness 
because of the negative publicity, the primary purpose behind calling 
a witness in this context is to pillory him or her.252 
The Lois Lerner controversy serves as a clear example of such 
harm to an individual.253  Lerner was forced to appear before the 
Oversight Committee on two separate occasions, despite stating that 
she intended to invoke her constitutional right and then actually 
doing so.254  Before both hearings—but particularly after her first 
compelled appearance—there was no realistic possibility that Lerner 
would provide the committee with any useful information, because 
she had already stated through her attorney that she would not 
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answer questions.  It seems indisputable that the primary (if not sole) 
purpose of compelling Lerner to appear was to publicly embarrass 
her and thereby win political points.255  This runs counter to both the 
spirit and plain language of Rule 4.4, which discourages using tactics 
of obtaining evidence that have no substantial purpose beyond 
embarrassing a third party.256  It is also inconsistent with Opinion 31 
and Opinion 358, which both counsel against calling witnesses merely 
to pillory them.257 
The Comment to Rule 4.4 bolsters the case against compelling 
witness testimony.258  The Comment states that “a lawyer may not 
disregard the rights of third persons.”259  Compelling a witness to 
appear to assert his or her right against self-incrimination in a public 
congressional hearing clearly conveys an indifference to, if not disdain 
for, the Fifth Amendment.  For example, Congressman Jack 
Brooks’s260 questioning of Lieutenant North during the Iran-Contra 
congressional hearing clearly demonstrated such “disregard” for the 
Fifth Amendment.  In that hearing, Congressman Brooks said to 
Lieutenant North, “[y]ou’ve stated, numerous times during the past 
few days, that you didn’t think you’d broken laws and you may not 
have.  In any case, . . . if you felt so strongly that you hadn’t, I had a 
little difficulty understanding your reluctance to testify without 
immunity.”261  This type of questioning reflects a sense that the Fifth 
Amendment is “a spurious defense by those who sought to conceal 
spurious acts.”262  It reveals a general disregard for the Fifth 
Amendment as a foundational constitutional right.  Accordingly, 
pursuant to the Comment to Rule 4.4, witnesses should not be 
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compelled to testify merely to assert their constitutional right because 
doing so actually serves to denigrate the individual’s right. 
Further, congressional hearings also implicate the individual desire 
to be free from public shaming and humiliation.263  In Emspak and 
Quinn, the Supreme Court recognized the harsh impact on an 
individual forced to assert his Fifth Amendment rights in a public, 
investigative setting.264  In fact, the government candidly argued in 
those cases that the witness failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
rights because he deliberately phrased his objections in equivocal 
ways “to obtain the benefit of the privilege without invoking the 
popular opprobrium which often attends to its exercise.”265  The Court 
also acknowledged the harsh price often paid when someone asserts 
his or her Fifth Amendment rights by referring to the potential 
“stigma” that attaches to Fifth Amendment invocation.266  Similarly, 
Justice Douglas trenchantly observed in his dissent in United States v. 
Welden: 
There was a time when a committee, knowing that a witness would 
not answer a question by reason of the Fifth Amendment, would not 
put the question to him. Today, witnesses who invoke the Fifth 
Amendment at the threshold have been minutely examined, 
apparently to see how many times they can be forced to invoke it.  
Hearings have indeed often become a spectacle . . . But the more I 
see of the awesome power of government to ruin people, to drive 
them from public life, to brand them forever as undesirable, the 
deeper I feel that protective measures are needed.267 
Justice Douglas’s comments are made all the more powerful 
considering that he expressed these concerns at a time before the 
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Internet enabled individuals around the world to view congressional 
hearings instantly and repeatedly.  Considering the Comment to Rule 
4.4 and the Court’s concern for the potential shaming effect of 
compelling public testimony, members of Congress should decline to 
require witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights in public 
hearings. 
Although the D.C. Bar attempted to strike a fair balance between 
these competing interests in adopting Opinion 358, Congress should 
not follow the approach described in Opinion 358 because it is 
inconsistent with Opinion 31, as well as Standard 3-5.7(c), and Rule 
4.4.  Opinion 358 is at odds with these other relevant opinions 
because it effectively allows a member of Congress to compel any 
witness to appear before a committee so long as the sole purpose of 
compelling the witness is not to pillory him or her.268  Further, 
Opinion 358 provides that one legitimate reason for compelling a 
witness is to determine whether the witness will actually assert his or 
her right.269  This determination will always allow a committee to 
force a witness to appear before the committee because the only way 
to definitively prove that a witness will invoke the right against self-
incrimination is by forcing the witness to do so publicly.  Put simply, 
Opinion 358 grants near-universal authority to compel testimony, 
which is in conflict with the other relevant ethical opinions.  As noted 
above, Opinion 31, Standard 3-5.7(c), and Rule 4.4 strongly 
discourage requiring an individual to appear merely to assert his or 
her constitutional right.  Accordingly, Opinion 358’s excessively 
permissive language should not be followed by members of Congress. 
B. Constitutional Reasons That Congress Should Not Be Able 
to Compel Public Assertion of Fifth Amendment Rights 
In balancing the competing interests implicated in compelling 
testimony, the individual’s constitutional right should outweigh 
Congress’s general interest in conducting investigations for two 
reasons.  First, allowing witnesses to be forced to publicly assert their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination fails to give proper 
deference to the Fifth Amendment.270  Second, and relatedly, it 
undermines the Fifth Amendment’s legitimacy.271  Accordingly, a 
witness should not be compelled to invoke a valid claim of Fifth 
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Amendment privilege before Congress in a public hearing because of 
the detrimental and delegitimizing effect it will have on a 
fundamental constitutional right. 
Members of Congress should not be permitted to require 
individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment rights in public, because 
it is antithetical to the basic principle of preventing self-incrimination 
enshrined in the constitutional right.  The Supreme Court described 
this right as “a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent 
though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, 
unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions.”272  Additionally, in Quinn, the 
Court explained that “the Self-Incrimination Clause ‘must be 
accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to 
secure.’”273  In light of the Court’s characterization of the right as a 
precious protection against tyranny and the Court’s recognition that it 
should be liberally interpreted, this constitutional bulwark should be 
prioritized over Congress’s general investigative role.274  Therefore, to 
uphold the right, members of Congress should not force individuals to 
testify merely to assert their privilege. 
Furthermore, forcing individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment 
right delegitimizes the constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination.  The Court in Quinn expressed that, “[t]o apply the 
privilege narrowly or begrudgingly—to treat it as an historical relic, at 
most merely to be tolerated—is to ignore its development and 
purpose.”275  By calling witnesses to appear in public hearings simply 
to assert their constitutional rights in front of the cameras breeds the 
exact type of begrudging disrespect the Court warned against in 
Quinn.276  In fact, Congress’s practice of compelling individuals to 
appear at congressional hearings in the 1950s is what led to the rise of 
the pejorative “Fifth Amendment Communist.”277  To stop breeding 
distaste for a cherished constitutional right, Congress should cease its 
practice of compelling witness testimony once a witness expresses 
intent to invoke the right against self-incrimination.  As the Court 
explained, “[i]t is precisely at such times—when the privilege is under 
attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 
(1908)). 
 273. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
 274. See id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515. 
608 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
guilty—that governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in 
protecting its exercise.”278 
C. Legislative Policy Reasons Not to Compel Public Assertion 
of Fifth Amendment Rights 
Congress should also not be permitted to compel witnesses to 
publicly assert their right to remain silent because it does not further 
the legislative process.  Congress has broad authority to conduct 
investigations pursuant to its legislative power.279  However, as the 
Court explained in Watkins: 
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of 
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the 
Congress . . . [n]or is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency.  
These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of 
government.  No inquiry is an end in itself, it must be related to, and 
in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.280 
Similarly, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court emphasized that “[a] 
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of 
information.”281 
As former Senator J. William Fulbright explained, “a congressional 
investigation is primarily a search for information which it believed is 
needed in order to solve a governmental problem.”282  However, when 
Congress compels an individual to appear before a congressional 
committee to merely assert his or her right against self-incrimination, 
it receives no information.283  The committee obtains nothing beyond 
the witness’s declination to answer questions.  This effort does not 
further the legislative process, because the only information it 
provides is inferential.  Legislating based on inference is ineffective 
policy-making that is frowned upon by members of Congress.284  For 
example, during the first oversight hearing involving Lerner, 
Chairman Issa stated that Lerner’s “assertion is not to be viewed or 
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used during this hearing to make any determination, plus or minus, as 
to actions that were taken [by the IRS].”285  Other members of the 
committee, particularly Ranking Member Cummings, expressed 
strong support for Chairman Issa’s statement.286  This rare moment of 
bipartisanship serves to reinforce the notion that a witness’s silence 
does not further the legislative purpose.287 
D. Alternatives to Gather Relevant Information When a 
Witness Claims Fifth Amendment Rights During a Congressional 
Hearing 
Precluding compelled public assertions of the privilege against self-
incrimination does not mean that Congress can do nothing if it 
determines that the only way to obtain critical information is by 
compelling an individual’s testimony.  In such an instance, Congress 
has already established a mechanism by which it can get this 
information—granting immunity.  As discussed in Part I, pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005, Congress may grant immunity to an 
individual with “a majority of the House or Senate or by a two-thirds 
vote of the full committee seeking the order.”288  Instead of forcing 
witnesses to appear before Congress to assert their right to remain 
silent, granting immunity would enable a congressional committee to 
obtain information that would aid its investigation.  As Congress has 
already established the mechanism by which it grants immunity, it is 
reasonable to believe that Congress will be able to easily immunize 
witnesses who may possess relevant information but have expressed 
an intent to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Although granting immunity does present a challenge when the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is engaged in a simultaneous 
investigation, this challenge is not insurmountable.289  Congress 
should work with the DOJ to decide whether to grant an individual 
immunity despite the detrimental effect the immunity may have on 
any potential criminal prosecution.  In fact, such coordination is 
mandated in the immunity statute, as the Attorney General must be 
notified at least ten days before the request for immunity order is 
issued.290  Additionally, the Attorney General can request a twenty-
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day delay in issuing the order.291  These requirements should facilitate 
coordination between Congress and the DOJ and prevent scenarios 
such as the Oliver North failed prosecution from occurring in the 
future. 
Even if Congress is unable to develop an effective working 
relationship with the DOJ on the issue of immunity, it can still 
balance these two interests.292  One commentator has suggested that 
Congress should only grant immunity when “the demands of a 
national crisis may justify sacrificing the criminal prosecution of those 
involved . . . to uncover and publicize the truth.”293  In other instances 
where there is less urgency, a more deliberate criminal prosecution 
can be undertaken.294  This approach seems to offer an effective 
solution that will ensure that Congress can obtain critical information 
when appropriate without unnecessarily hampering law enforcement 
efforts. 
It is also important to note that while the holdings in the cases 
prosecuting Lieutenant North295 and naval officer Poindexter296 during 
the Iran-Contra scandal have made it more difficult for prosecutors to 
secure the convictions of individuals who have received immunity, 
Congress has nevertheless continued to grant immunity to 
witnesses.297  In fact, as recently as 2008, the House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary (“Judiciary Committee”) granted 
immunity for witnesses to testify in hearings regarding the forced 
resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys.298  The Judiciary Committee 
voted thirty-two to six in favor of granting immunity to former DOJ 
staffer Monica Goodling after she informed the committee of her 
intent to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.299  Instead of 
compelling Goodling to appear before Congress merely to assert her 
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right against self-incrimination, the Judiciary Committee granted her 
immunity and then issued a subpoena to compel her testimony and 
the production of documents.300  Goodling subsequently testified 
before the Judiciary Committee and offered information that assisted 
the congressional investigation.301  In this way, the Judiciary 
Committee was able to actually gather information for its 
investigation without subjecting the witness to needless public 
shaming.302  This approach—which avoids the inherent issues 
associated with calling a witness to assert the Fifth Amendment and 
ensures that Congress will obtain information—is a viable alternative 
solution in instances where a witness will invoke the right to remain 
silent. 
Another way to balance individual constitutional rights with 
Congress’s legislative power is to compel the witness to appear at a 
closed executive session before the congressional committee.303  This 
approach will ensure that the individual actually asserts his or her 
right in front of Congress.  On the other hand, granting immunity 
remains a preferable approach because it enables Congress to obtain 
information it seeks.  Unlike an assertion of the right against self-
incrimination, granting immunity compels the individual to answer 
Congress’s questions and provides Congress with the information it 
seeks to further its investigative and legislative goals.  As the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility explains, “[t]he primary 
business of a legislative body is to enact laws rather than to adjudicate 
controversies.”304  Accordingly, when the information a witness may 
possess is sufficiently important, Congress should grant the person 
immunity to obtain the information instead of calling the witness to a 
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closed session to test the individual’s resolve in asserting his or her 
constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional investigations face legitimate challenges when 
confronted with witnesses who may possess important information 
but are unwilling to appear before a committee to testify because the 
information will tend to incriminate them.  In balancing these 
competing interests, Congress should embrace the approach taken in 
Standard 3-5.7(c), which explicitly counsels against calling a witness in 
a criminal prosecution when the prosecutor knows the witness will 
claim a valid privilege not to testify.  This approach is consistent with 
the true spirit of the ethical rules.  It also properly places the 
individual right against self-incrimination above Congress’s oversight 
power and will ensure that Congress makes its legislative decisions 
based on facts and not speculation driven by witness silence. 
 
